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Abstract. This paper builds a circular road model of the world with horizon-
tal product diﬀerentiation and free entry and exit of ﬁrms, to show that freer
international trade increases welfare –with ideal variety preferences– through
the exploitation of economies of scale and better allocative eﬃciency, that all
participating countries gain from trade, and that smaller countries have more
to win from free trade than larger countries. Political resistance to trade liberal-
ization, international migration and foreign direct investment are also analyzed
with the model. Finally, the model provides a microfoundation for the use of
demand curves with constant and negative slopes.
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Resumen. Este documento construye un modelo de carretera circular del mun-
do con diferenciaci´ on horizontal de producto y libre entrada y salida de ﬁrmas,
para mostrar que un comercio internacional m´ as libre aumenta el bienestar
–con preferencias de variedad ideal– por medio de la explotaci´ on de econom´ ıas
de escala y de una mejor asignaci´ on de recursos, que todos los pa´ ıses partici-
pantes ganan con el comercio y que los pa´ ıses m´ as peque˜ nos tienen m´ as que
ganar del libre comercio que los pa´ ıses grandes. La resistencia pol´ ıtica a la
liberaci´ on del comercio, la migraci´ on internacional y la inversi´ on extranjera
directa tambi´ en son estudiados con el modelo. Finalmente, el modelo provee
una microfundamentaci´ on para el uso de curvas de demanda con pendientes
constantes y negativas.
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1. Introduction
This paper builds on the circular road model of horizontal product diﬀeren-
tiation of Eaton et al. (1975) with free entry and exit of ﬁrms, to derive results
that can be applied in industrial organization, international trade and political
economy.
The model shows that freer international trade increases welfare –with ideal
variety preferences– through the exploitation of economies of scale and im-
proved allocative eﬃciency, that all participating countries gain from trade,
and that smaller countries have more to win from free trade than larger coun-
tries. Furthermore, the model explains that there may be adjustment costs when
liberalizing trade and thus, political resistance to trade liberalization. Interna-
tional migration can also be analyzed with the model, showing the possibility of
suboptimal migration ﬂows and political barriers to the exit of national citizens.
The model suggests that foreign direct investment will be welfare improving
for the source country in the short run and for the receiving country in the
long run.
2. Previous literature
Many of the insights generated in this paper have been derived before in a
monopolistic competition model within a general equilibrium setting, by Lan-
caster (1979) –with ideal variety preferences– and by Krugman (1979) –with
love of variety preferences–. In fact, the model presented in this paper can be
interpreted –at least in part– as a formal and partial equilibrium representa-
tion of the model presented in an intuitive manner by Lancaster (1979). A
similar approach, but with some diﬀerences in the parameters used and em-
phasising the eﬀects of tariﬀs, was followed by Schmitt (1990). Other authors
that have written in this area are, among others, Salop (1979), Schmitt (1995),
and Boccard and Wauthy (2000).
The main contributions of this paper are that the results here generated are
derived within a partial equilibrium framework, highlighting the diﬀerent eﬀects
of trade in goods between larger and smaller countries, providing insights for the
political economy of trade and migration, and exploring the short and long run
impacts of foreign direct investment. The paper also provides a microfoundation
for the use of demand curves with constant and negative slopes.
3. The model
3.1. Assumptions and notation
The basic assumptions of the model presented in this paper are:
i. The world can be represented as a circular road of extension equal to a,
where all countries are located one on top of the other (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. A circular road world
bB
bA
bRest of the world
Location of firms in country B
Location of firms in country A
ii. There is one industry (this is a partial equilibrium model).
iii. The good produced is homogeneous in quality, but not in location.
iv. There are N producers of the homogeneous good, that represent N varieties
of that good in terms of location.
v. Firms play a two stage game: on the ﬁrst stage they determine locations,
and on the second stage they determine their prices.
vi. To solve the model by backward induction, in the second stage of the game




vii. Each ﬁrm has the same cost structure, TC = f + ex, where f is the ﬁxed
cost and e is the constant marginal cost.
viii. Consumers are homogeneous and uniformly distributed along the circular
road (there are β consumers on every unit of distance of the road, with
β > 0).
ix. Consumers have identical ideal variety preferences and they all consume
one unit of the good, as long as the utility they receive from that consump-
tion is non-negative (assuming that u∗ = 0 when there is no consumption).
Thus, the representative consumer will have the following utility function:
U = u∗ − p − td (1)
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where
u∗ = utility derived from consuming one unit of the good,
p = unit price of the good,
t = unit transport cost for the consumers, with t > 0, and
d = distance to the nearest producer.
x. There are no international transport costs.
3.2. Autarky equilibrium
In this paper, a symmetrical equilibrium is searched. Thus, the second stage
of the game identiﬁes what a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices is. Then, by
backward induction, the ﬁrst stage of the game identiﬁes a Nash equilibrium
in locations. The paper also identiﬁes what the number of producers is, what
their sales are, and what the level of welfare per capita is at equilibrium.
To do so, the model works with the long run monopolistic competition con-
ditions as follows: ﬁrst, the sales of a typical ﬁrm in a circular road model are
derived. Then, the optimal strategy price and the corresponding quantities are
obtained from the proﬁt maximization condition. These price and quantities
–and the locations initially assumed– are shown to be not only optimal strate-
gies for the ﬁrm, but also a Nash equilibrium for the market. The next step is
to ﬁnd the endogenous number of ﬁrms (varieties) from the zero proﬁt condi-
tions. Finally, the autarky equilibrium is completed by expressing the utility
function of the average consumer in terms of the parameters of the model, and
analysing the impacts that changes in the parameters of the model have on key
variables.
3.2.1. Deriving the sales of a typical ﬁrm in a circular road model
Given the assumptions, it is possible to construct Hotelling’s umbrellas,1 as
shown in Figure 2.
The vertical bases of the umbrellas show the location of each producer, and
the extension of the vertical bases represent the prices charged by the producers
located at each base. The slope of the arms of the umbrella is the uniform
unit transport cost for the consumers. Given that the total cost incurred by a
consumer located at a given point over the circular road –when buying a unit
of the good– is the price paid plus the unit transport cost multiplied by the
distance travelled, the heights of the arms of Hotelling’s umbrellas show the
total cost for a given consumer buying the good from the producer located at
the base corresponding to each umbrella.
1This version of Hotelling’s model is based on the class notes taken by the author from
the lectures of Professor John Sutton. For an alternative explanation of Hotelling’s model see
Cabral (2000).
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Figure 2. The circular world model and Hotelling’s umbrellas
[(a/N)-d] d
p p p
The equation that describes the marginal consumer, i.e., the consumer that
is indiﬀerent between buying from the producer located nearest to the right
hand side and the producer located nearest to the left hand side, is















Given that the model is symmetric and, in particular, given that the per
unit transport costs are uniform, the sales of the representative producer x and,
in particular, of the producer located in the middle of Figure 2, are
x = 2dβ (2)
2dβ =
￿















3.2.2. Proﬁt maximization condition
For simplicity and clearness of exposition, it is of interest to analyse if the
case where all ﬁrms charge identical prices is a Nash equilibrium, regardless of
whether it is unique or optimal for society as a whole.
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To show this, note that the proﬁt maximization condition for the ﬁrm under
consideration, given that all other ﬁrms charge the same price ¯ p, is
Π = px − f − ex
= p
"￿







− f − e
"￿















β − f −
￿


















¯ p − 2p +
αt
N
+ e = 0
Now assume that the ﬁrm under consideration maximizes proﬁts and, also,





Now, this price is charged by the ﬁrm maximizing proﬁts, given that all
the other ﬁrms are charging this same price. Thus, it is an optimal strategy
for that ﬁrm. Repeating the same process for all other ﬁrms, the symmetrical
equilibrium in prices is found to be a Nash equilibrium, regardless of whether
it is unique or optimal for society as a whole.






Note that in the circular road model, if all ﬁrms charge identical prices,
locating at a distance
α
N
in the ﬁrst stage of the game is a Nash equilibrium in
location. Thus, a Nash equilibrium is found for location in the ﬁrst stage and
for prices in the second stage of the game.
3.2.3. The zero proﬁt condition
Free entry and exit of ﬁrms ensures that, in the long run, ﬁrms will have
zero proﬁts. The zero proﬁt condition of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms is met when
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Thus, the total number of ﬁrms (varieties), expressed in terms of the para-






Replacing (6) in (4), the equilibrium price can also be expressed in terms






Since the price includes a mark-up over marginal cost, resources are not
allocated eﬃciently. The lower the ﬁxed and transport costs, and the higher
the market density, the better the allocative eﬃciency and the lower the price.
Falls in the marginal cost will also lower the equilibrium price.






This means that higher population density and ﬁxed costs, and lower unit
transport costs lead to higher equilibrium quantities. Note also that, in the sym-

















which is a demand curve with a constant and negative slope. In this sense, the
model developed in this paper provides a microfoundation for the use of this
simple type of demand curves.








The utility function of the marginal consumer, in terms of the parameters of
the model, can now be obtained by substituting (6), (7) and (9) in (1) yielding
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Now, in the symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices, the utility of the con-
sumer located exactly in the same place where a producer is located is u∗ − p.






On the other hand, the utility of the marginal consumer is given by (10). This








Besides, the utility of the average consumer is given by
U =









Thus, a nation’s welfare per capita in autarky will increase (decrease), the
lower (greater) the ﬁxed, marginal and transport costs, and the greater (lower)
the population density.
Note that, since individuals have ideal variety preferences, and since the
number of varieties is endogenous, the impact of the number of varieties avail-
able on welfare can be expressed in terms of the parameters of the model. Note
also that the size of the circular road (α) has a direct eﬀect on the number of
ﬁrms, but it does not have an impact on the level of production per ﬁrm and
the level of equilibrium prices and so, it does not aﬀect the level of welfare.
3.3. International trade
International trade can be introduced in this model as an increase in popu-
lation density perceived by the producers of the good.2 To do so, assume that




The circular road world with free trade between A and B will look as in
Figure 3.
2The size of the circular road (α) is kept constant and equal in all countries since, as
mentioned above, it aﬀects the number of producers, but it does not aﬀect output per ﬁrm,
prices and welfare.
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Figure 3. A circular road world with free trade between A and B
bA+bB
bRest of the world
Location of varieties in A
and B with free trade
To start with, note that if both countries are identical, their autarky equi-
librium conditions are also identical. However, if one country is smaller than the
other, the larger country in autarky has more varieties, lower prices, higher out-
put of each variety produced, and greater welfare per capita, than the smaller
country.
Note also that, with free trade and no international transport costs between
A and B, the change in population density perceived in A and B will lead to























This means that in both A and B, and regardless of whether A and B
are large and/or small, the number of varieties available increases, per unit
prices fall, output of each variety increases, and welfare per capita rises. These
gains from trade are generated by the better exploitation of economies of scale
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(higher output per ﬁrm) and the improved allocative eﬃciency (lower mark-up
of prices over marginal costs), thanks to the free entry and exit of ﬁrms (lower
unit costs of production and zero proﬁts at equilibrium).
Furthermore, the free trade varieties, prices, output per variety and welfare
per citizen are all identical in both countries, regardless of their original size.
As such, the gains from free trade are larger for smaller countries, than for
larger countries.
It has been shown that NFT > NA and that NFT > NB. Under this condi-
tions, the pattern of trade will be intra-industry –local varieties are exported
and foreign varieties of the same good are imported–.
3.4. Political economy of trade policy










The sum of the varieties available in autarky in country A plus the number
of varieties available in autarky in country B is


























which is true as long as βA > 0 and βB > 0, i.e., as long as countries A and B
exist.
Thus,
NA + NB > NFT
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The number of varieties available with free trade is less than the sum of
varieties available in A and in B in autarky. This means that since the remaining
ﬁrms produce more, and the total density of the countries and the consumption
per capita do not change, some ﬁrms have to exit the market.
This result is important for political economy reasons. In particular, there
will be resistance to trade liberalization, because some ﬁrms will disappear
–and some factors will have to move from some ﬁrms to other ﬁrms– introducing
adjustment costs. However, such resistance may be milder with intra-industry
trade than with inter-industry trade, since factors are moving within the same
sector, as is the case in this paper. Besides, in the long run resources will remain
fully employed with free trade, just as they were in autarky.
3.5. International migration
International migration can be introduced in this model as a shift in pop-
ulation density between countries.3 With no trade in goods and services, and
ceteris paribus, if countries A and B free up population movements, the fol-
lowing eﬀects will occur:
i. As pointed out earlier, if one country has a higher population than the
other, its citizens have a higher welfare. For example, if βA > βB, then












Thus, if population movements are allowed ceteris paribus, all the people
move from the small country (B) to the large country (A). This situation
is shown in Figure 4.
ii. If A and B are identical, there are no movements, since per capita welfare
is identical. However, this equilibrium is unstable, since all that is required
is that one consumer move from one country to the other (to make welfare
in the receiving country higher than in the country of origin) for all his
fellow countrymen to do the same, just as in the previous case.
iii. If one country has a technological advantage (lower f, e and/or t)
–assuming that there are no technological transfers between countries–
and both countries are identical in all other respects, the technologically
advanced country has higher autarky welfare. For example, if fA > fB,












3If marginal consumers move from one country to the other, there is a reallocation of the
population such that the density is reduced, but remains uniform.
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Figure 4. A circular road world with free movements of population
between A and B, where βA > βB
bA
bOther countries
and all consumers will go from the less technologically advanced country
(A) to the more technologically advanced country (B).
iv. If one country has a technological advantage (lower f, e and/or t)
–assuming that there are no technological transfers between countries–
and, at the same time, that country is smaller than the other country, the
size advantage may more than compensate the technological advantage in



















In this case, all consumers go from the more technologically advanced coun-
try (B) to the less technologically advanced country (A) and the ﬁnal equi-
librium is pareto dominated, i.e., there are suboptimal migration ﬂows. All
the consumers in the world would be better oﬀ if they managed to live in
the technologically advanced country.
3.6. Political economy of international migration
In this model, if international migration occurs at all, it leads to emptying
one country. Although this is an unlikely outcome, in this case, such movements
could lead political leaders –and maybe some economists– of the country whose
consumers are leaving, to put barriers to the exit (rather than barriers to the
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entry) in order to avoid the massive departure of citizens. To understand why,
assume that A has a higher autarky welfare than B and that all consumers in
B want to migrate to A. If all consumers in B go to A, all consumers from B
have higher welfare than before (the gross national income is then higher in
both countries A and B). But the citizens located in B (none), will have zero
welfare (the gross domestic product in B is zero and lower than in autarky).
Now, think of a dramatic, but not complete, migratory movement for ad-hoc
reasons (such as language, climate and religion).4 Then, the citizens that for
whatever reason remain in country B are worse oﬀ than in autarky (again, B
then has a lower gross domestic product).
This could explain –at least in part–, although it may not justify, the exit
restrictions that have prevailed in certain countries, or those that prevailed in
former communist countries, given the welfare incentives for consumers and
policy makers.
3.7. Foreign direct investment
In this model, with identical cost structures, without international trade and
ceteris paribus, if ﬁrms have identical technologies, there are no incentives for
foreign direct investment (FDI) ﬂows, regardless of the size of the countries.
However, if ﬁrms in country B have a technological advantage over ﬁrms in
country A, there is an incentive for FDI ﬂows to move from B to A since, at
the prices in A, ﬁrms from B would be able to make a positive proﬁt in the short
run. However, if there is free entry and exit of foreign investors, eventually, the
ﬁrms from B investing in A would have zero economic proﬁts in the long run.


















This paper has built on the circular road model of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation. The model derived shows that, in autarky, larger countries have
higher welfare than smaller countries. The model also shows that freer inter-
national trade increases welfare –with ideal variety preferences– through the
exploitation of economies of scale and through better allocative eﬃciency, that
beneﬁt consumers thanks to the free entry and exit of ﬁrms.
In autarky, larger countries have higher welfare than smaller countries and,
although all countries that take part in international trade gain from trade,
4Future work may focus on modelling the reasons why some consumers decide to stay in
the smaller country.
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with free trade all of the world’s countries have the same welfare per capita,
regardless of their population size. This implies that smaller countries have
more to win from free trade than larger countries. As is usual in the literature
of trade with imperfect competition, the pattern of trade in this model is intra-
industry.
Furthermore, the model explains that there may be adjustment costs when
liberalizing trade, because some producers will exit the market and some factors
will have to move from some ﬁrms to other ﬁrms. These adjustment costs
are likely to generate political resistance to trade liberalization, although such
resistance may be milder with intra-industry trade than with inter-industry
trade, since factors will be moving within the same sector. Besides, in the long
run, all resources will be fully employed with free trade, as they were in the
autarky equilibrium.
Allowing for international migration within the model has highlighted the
possibility of both suboptimal migration ﬂows and the existence of political bar-
riers to the exit of national citizens. Besides, foreign direct investment would
provide short run gains for the source country and long run gains for the re-
ceiving country. As a by product, this paper has provided microfoundations for
the use of demand curves with constant and negative slopes.
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